1. The philosophical debate regarding the ‘rights of future generations’ has intensified during the past thirty years, due to increasing worries over the destiny of our ecosystem, which has become endangered by the consequences of human activity. The most important right for future generations, recognised by many philosophers, is the right to a clean environment and, more generally, the right not to be physically harmed as a direct or indirect consequence of the actions of previous generations. In fact, interest in the destiny of future generations is not exclusively of our time. It is also possible to find this concern in the writings of numerous philosophers, ancient and modern, as well as in some religious traditions and political constitutions.
For example, at the end of the eighteenth century, Kant dealt with two of the main problems that are still treated today in the philosophical debate about future generations. The first issue involves what importance should be assigned to future persons when we ethically evaluate the foreseeable outcomes of our actions. Kant maintained that we must not be indifferent even to the farthest age that humankind is destined to reach [1]. Moreover, this interest in posterity is implicit in the first formulation of the Kantian categorical imperative, which invites to act “so that the maxim of your will can always... hold good as a principle of universal legislation” [2]. Kant’s second concern with which principles of justice should be valid between generations is also evident in his disappointed remark that previous generations seem to work hard to the advantage only of future generations, without obtaining anything in return [3].
In Judeo-Christianity, the religious tradition most familiar to us, there are many passages in the Old and New Testaments in which a conception of the relationship between man and nature is outlined. Human beings are often depicted as fiduciary administrators designated by the Creator to take care of other living creatures in the best possible way and to preserve them as a heritage for future generations. Karl Marx expressed a similar idea when he noted that not even all the peoples of a certain age considered together are the owners of the Earth; they are only usufructuaries, with a duty to transfer the Earth improved to the following generations [4]. Many ancient and modern constitutions make more or less explicit reference to future citizens. It is enough to cite here the Constitution of the United States of America (1787), which begins ‘(w)e, the People of the United States; in Order to … establish Justice … promote the general Welfare and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution’.
At the beginning of the twentieth century, many utilitarian philosophers, in particular H. Sidgwick, maintained an important thesis indirectly related to future generations – that the passing of time is morally irrelevant. In effect, Sidgwick observed that “the time at which a man exists cannot affect the value of his happiness from a universal point of view” [5]. Therefore, in the utilitarian calculation, pleasant sensations experienced by future persons will count as much as those felt by our contemporaries. He added, however, that the effects of our actions on living persons are much more predictable than those on future individuals and it is necessary to consider this fact if we want to make a correct utilitarian calculation.
2. One of the main problems raised by the idea of our responsibility towards future generations is the following: is it possible to assign rights to them and, if so, then which ones? Some authors on this subject have argued that it is not possible to attribute rights to future individuals not yet conceived and they support this thesis with a variety of arguments. According to one argument, future persons cannot have rights because they are completely incapable of vindicating them. However, this can be countered by the suggestion that the rights of future generations can be anticipated and defended by opportune representatives. Moreover, it can be argued that it is possible to have rights even in the absence of the capacity to vindicate them (as is the case, for example, with the rights of newborn babies). R. De George developed another argument that objects to the attribution of rights to future generations based on the ontological argument that ‘future generations’ by definition do not exist and “they cannot now, therefore, be the present bearer or subject of anything, including rights” [6].
It is possible however, to bypass this problem by attributing to future persons some rights that are contingent upon the effective existence of future generations. It can be asserted that if, and when, future people exist, they will have some rights. Consequently, we must make every effort to ensure that these rights will not be violated in the future. If we bequeath to future generations a natural environment that is unliveable and characterised by extremely scarce resources, we will thus make inevitable the future violation of their right to the minimal conditions of a decent life.
The right to life in relation to people not yet conceived poses an even greater challenge. The expression ‘a future generations’ right to life’ can have at least two different meanings. On the one hand, we can identify this right with the legitimate demand of future persons not to be wrongfully killed (after being born). If intended in this sense, it seems that we do not have a problem with attributing a right to life to future generations. On the other hand, a future generations’ right to life can also be interpreted as a ‘right to be born’. This refers to a future generations’ right to be conceived, a right of future persons not to be prevented from acquiring an actual existence. If interpreted in this second sense, the acknowledgement of a right to life for future generations would create very difficult problems. In fact, if this right were contingent upon the existence of future generations (as all their rights seem to be), it would not be possible to violate it. Actually, when we decide not to conceive a (future) person, we cannot violate his (or her) contingent right to be born because the consequence of our decision is that s/he will never exist. The necessary condition for a specific person to have a right to be born will never arise as that condition is precisely his (or her) future existence. Discussing the right to be born for future generations seems therefore to be a contradictio in adiecto. Nevertheless, the possibility remains open that even if future generations have no right to be born, the present generation still has a moral duty not to prevent them from existing. In other words, there could be a moral duty not to permit the extinction of the human race. To maintain this thesis, however, we would have to reject the perfect correlation between rights and duties by admitting the existence of duties without corresponding rights on the part of others.
3. However, why should we care about future generations? Why should we feel responsible for them? Even if it could be established that we are, which criteria should guide us in the ethical evaluation of those decisions that can influence the destiny of future generations?
In light of the above considerations, I will examine four influential argumentative strategies inspired, respectively, by Aristotelian-Kantian deontological ethics, liberal theory of rights, utilitarian ethics, and contractarianism. I will then briefly analyse the implications that these theories have on the problem of our responsibility towards future generations.
4. Perhaps the most ambitious attempt to discover the bases of our responsibility towards future generations has been developed by Hans Jonas, especially in his famous book Das Prinzip Verantwortung [7]. According to Jonas, modern technology makes men capable of influencing the entire ecosystem in a vast and durable way; as a consequence, we are led to rethink some ethical categories, first of all that of responsibility. In fact, while in the past the presence of mankind on earth was an original and unquestionable datum that we could not influence, such a presence has now become the primary object of our moral obligation.
Jonas proposes a new categorical imperative: “Act in a way such that the effects of your action are compatible with the permanence of genuine life on earth” [8]. That means that we must not be taken in by the promises of modern technology: we have to pay attention, instead, to the possible negative consequences of our actions, in order not to cause them; in particular, we must not treat the existence or the essence of man globally intended, as something on which we have a right to gamble by our actions. The extinction of mankind, in fact, is such a terrible risk that even the smallest possibility of its realisation is a price too high to be worth paying.
But what is the grounding of our duty towards not-yet-existing people? Jonas’ reply is that we are responsible towards the idea or the essence of man; even more radically, we have a primary duty towards the being and against non-being. So, the ultimate grounding of our responsibility towards future generations is to be found – according to Jonas – only in the metaphysics as a doctrine of being.
The profundity of Jonas’ theory is, in my opinion, also its limitation. In effect, Jonas explicitly presents his ‘planetary macroethics of responsibility’ as a proposal that everybody has to accept and practice in order to prevent a catastrophic future. But it seems extremely difficult to find a vast consensus on the bases of such strong metaphysical theses as those of Jonas, inspired as they are by an Aristotelian teleology not acceptable to everybody.
5. It is difficult to find an ethical perspective concerning future generations that is shared by every ‘rights theorist’: rights-based ethical theories are very heterogeneous, and authors have therefore reached different conclusions. The main reference of the debate has generally been the theory proposed by R. Nozick in his book Anarchy, State and Utopia [9]. According to Nozick, every right is to be intended as a negative right not to receive interference by the State: rights like that will supply each and every individual with an inviolable sphere of personal freedom.
R. Elliot has suggested [10] that every libertarian theory that, like Nozick’s, accepts the ‘Lockean proviso’ – according to which the appropriation of something is legitimate if “enough and as well has been left for others” – will also be a theory that recognises extended obligations towards future generations. Nozick, explicitly referring to Locke, states that a particular appropriation is legitimate if it does not diminish available resources in such a way that the conditions of someone else are worsened. Such a thesis presupposes the notion of a minimum level of available goods that we must guarantee to others when taking possession of something; this minimum level is to be guaranteed to future generations as well, because we can recognise that even they have some (contingent) rights.
But a hard problem arises that every rights-based theory has to face, when treating questions related to future generations: the ‘non-identity problem’ [11]. This problem is connected with the fact that the identity of a future person depends, in a decisive way, on the exact moment in which s/he will be conceived; his (or her) identity, in fact, depends on the particular spermatozoon and egg-cell that will carry his (or her) genetic inheritance.
Let’s consider the following case of a handicapped child. Imagine that a woman (call her Paula) knows that she has an illness (for example, German measles), so that if she decides to conceive a child at that moment, before the end of her illness, her child will be born with a cardiac malformation that will cause him (or her) to die at the age of 35. If, on the contrary, Paula waits some weeks, she will have a (different) child without that handicap. Let’s also suppose that Paula decides, all the same, to conceive her child immediately and that the child will thus be born with a cardiac malformation, have an overall pleasant life, but die at 35 as a direct consequence of his (or her) handicap.
Whoever considers this case will be inclined to think that Paula has behaved in a morally wrong way. But if we start from the principle that the sole relevant considerations are rights-based, which objection will we able to raise against her behaviour? The child, in fact, has had an overall pleasant life, and if Paula had waited to conceive, her child would not have been born at all - in his (or her) place a different child, without the handicap, would have been born. If someone accused Paula of violating her child’s right to be born without handicaps, she would therefore reply that, all things considered, being born with the handicap has been better for her child than not being born at all. Even if the child had a legal representative to claim in advance his (or her) right not to be born handicapped, the representative would surely accept waiving that right.
Rights-based theories therefore imply that it would not be morally wrong to conceive a child with a serious handicap, even if waiting some weeks were sufficient to conceive a child without that handicap. All this should induce us to think that considerations based on rights only are not sufficient to handle cases where the influence on the identity of future people is involved.
6. The most efficacious way to solve this difficulty, this ‘non-identity problem’, is by accepting the doctrine of total utilitarianism. According to this ethical theory, what morally counts is carrying out those actions whose consequences are the maximisation of happiness (and minimisation of unhappiness) on earth, without taking into account which particular individuals will experience pleasant or unpleasant states of consciousness. If we accept this theory, it will be easy for us to explain why Paula’s choice is morally unacceptable: by conceiving a child with a grave handicap rather than another one without that handicap, Paula has taken an action that will probably lead to a decrease of happiness in the world.
Total utilitarianism, on the other hand, implies the following “repugnant conclusion. For any possible and large population, say of 8 billion, all with a very high quality of life, there must be some much larger imaginable population whose existence, if other things are equal, would be better, and be what we ought to bring about, even though its members have lives that are barely worth living” [12].
According to total utilitarianism, in fact, it is possible to increase happiness in the world not only by improving the quality of life of already existing people, but also by increasing the number of people. This implies the following: an increase in the number of people can compensate for a loss in the quality of life. It is this consequence which appears repugnant to many.
In order to avoid this conclusion, J. Narveson [13] has proposed a ‘restricted’ version of total utilitarianism. According to Narveson, when maximising total happiness, only existing people are to be taken into account: our purpose is rendering people happy and not increasing the number of (less) happy people. But Narveson’s theory does not solve the non-identity problem cited above and it has other problematic implications as well. It implies, for example, that we would not do anything wrong if we decided to conceive a child in spite of knowing that his (or her) life will only be pure suffering: in fact, pains and pleasures of not-yet-existing people are not to be taken into consideration, according to Narveson’s theory, at the moment of the decision.
The last possibility consists in falling back on some form of average utilitarianism, a theory according to which our actions must tend to maximise not the total happiness in the world but the average happiness experienced by existing people. Average utilitarianism, nevertheless, has at least two implausible implications: a) it would be morally wrong, in a world where all the people are very happy, to conceive a foreseeably happy child if it were slightly less happy than the average level (because his/her birth would lower the average); b) a world with a billion people suffering atrocious pains would be preferable to an alternative world where only two people exist, if the average suffering of these last ones were even slightly higher.
It seems, finally, that total utilitarianism, even if it implies a consequence considered repugnant by many, is still the variant of utilitarian theory which is the most suitable to solve ethical problems with a variable number of persons, as problems connected with future generations are. Moreover, total utilitarianism implies that the interests of present and future people are to be equally taken into consideration, as every generation has exactly the same possibility of contributing to the increase of total happiness in the world.
7. The last ethical theory that I want to examine with regard to future generations is neocontractarianism, in the form developed by J.Rawls in A Theory of Justice [14]. According to Rawls, the principles of justice that we must accept are those chosen by rational, free and self-interested parties operating in an ideal ‘original position’; these agents should act behind a ‘veil of ignorance’, which does not prevent them from acquiring information relevant to choosing fair principles, but does conceal from them the specific situation of the society where they will live and the particular role they will play in it. Moreover, Rawls postulates that parties in the original position do not know which generation they will belong to: this should guarantee that the principles of justice will not give advantage to one generation, to the detriment of the others.
Rawls says that parties called to choose the principles of justice are to be considered as contemporaries (‘present time of entry interpretation’). This implies that they cannot influence the ‘savings rate’ adopted in the past: therefore, whether or not predecessors have been generous towards them, it will be worthwhile for people in the original position to agree on rules not including savings for the benefit of future generations. As a consequence, Rawls is compelled to add a ‘motivational assumption’, according to which the agents in the original position are not to be considered as purely self-interested individuals but as representatives of family lines (for example ‘heads of family’), where ties of sentiments are present between successive generations. In this way, contracting parties will be interested in the destiny of future generations from the very beginning.
Putting aside any considerations about the ‘ad hoc’ character of the motivational assumption, we can ask ourselves how it is possible to establish precisely how much a head of family is ready to personally sacrifice to the advantage of his descendants. And if we do not exactly know which sacrifices he will be disposed to make, neither will we know which principles of intergenerational justice he will choose.
As an alternative to this unsatisfactory way of dealing with the question, I propose reversing the point of view. We should start by asking ourselves what reasons there are to support the existence of moral duties towards future generations, independent of the acceptance of one or another ethical theory. If we succeed in demonstrating that such reasons exist, it will also become possible to test in depth the validity of a particular ethical theory. This will be done by verifying that theory is or is not capable of explaining those duties towards future generations whose importance had already been supported by independent reasons.
But which are these reasons? Which motives should induce us to think that members of the present generation have duties towards generations of the future? A promising line of argument is that of using a formal principle of equality, justified on the bases of the universalizability of moral judgements. In general terms, the principle of equality states that equal cases (or individuals) are to be ethically evaluated in the same way; or, putting it in negative terms, that it is not allowable to treat two cases (or individuals) differently in the absence of significant differences between them.
Many authors, as for example R. M. Hare [15] (who explicitely refers to Kant on this point), have observed that universalizability is a logical characteristic of moral judgements: if someone evaluates positively (or negatively) a certain A, he will then be bound – if he wants to avoid self-contradiction – to evaluate positively (or negatively) any other A that is similar to the first one in the relevant aspects (that is, those aspects inducing someone to evaluate A positively or negatively). And what reason can we have to evaluate differently the interests of people who will live in the future and those of already existing people?
In my opinion, the principal arguments supporting the thesis that we do not have any responsibility towards future generations, or at least that we should care much less for posterity than for our contemporaries, do not hold on a deep analysis. In fact, we can dispute these arguments as follows:
a) To people insisting on the fact that future generations cannot claim their interests, we can reply that neither could patients in reversible coma or newborn babies: and that this impossibility does not prevent someone else from representing and looking after their interests.
b) To people arguing that future individuals, as not existing, cannot have interests or rights, we can object that we can now attribute to future people some rights that are contingent upon their effective future existence; as a consequence, we already now have the moral (if not legal) duty to prevent those events that could render inevitable the future violation of such rights.
c) To people thinking that we are not responsible towards future generations because we cannot foresee their preferences and tastes, we can reply that there are some fundamental needs (for example, a liveable environment) that even remote generations will have in common with us.
d) To the supporters of a ‘discount rate’ that should be applied to the interests of future people, we can object that this conception has many problematic implications, as shown by D. Parfit [16] and other authors.
e) To people claiming that our responsibility towards future generations could be eluded by preventing future generations from existing (by means of a total interruption of new births), we can object that any ethical theory taking account of possible people – for example, total utilitarianism – will invite us to think of the continuation of human enterprise on earth as morally obligatory (provided that life conditions of future people will not be foreseeably unacceptable).
The way for a satisfactory justification of our responsibility towards future generations seems therefore to be open.
APPENDIX
Explicit references to future generations can be found in numerous international treaties and conventions regarding environmental protection. In the Stockholm Declaration (1972), is provided that “to defend and improve the environment for present and future generations has become an imperative goal for mankind”. The same document then declares that “natural resources of the earth, including the air, water, land, flora and fauna... must be safeguarded for the benefit of present and future generations”.
Later, the Bern Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats (1979) states that human beings ought to safeguard and transmit to future generations the natural heritage of wild plant and animal species. The Asian Agreement on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (1985) recognises the importance of natural resources for present and future generations and imposes clear duties on the south-east Asian states parties.
Other important international Conventions whose aim is to protect specific natural resources or environmental goods for the advantage of future generations deal with the following subjects: a) marine environment (Kuwait Convention, 1978; Jeddah Convention, 1982; Cartagena de Indias Protocol, 1983); b) natural resources (South Pacific Nature Convention, 1976); c) water (Transboundary Waters Convention, 1992); d) biological diversity (Biodiversity Convention, 1992); e) climate (Climate Change Convention, 1992).
Many international declarations make reference to intergenerational equity as an important aspect of the concept of sustainable development. Resolution 35/8 (1980) of the United Nations General Assembly establishes the existence of an “historical responsibility” towards future generations regarding the safeguard of natural environment, whereas Rio Declaration (1992) links intergenerational equity and the right to development, stating (principle 4) that the right to development must be satisfied in such a way that environmental and developmental needs of present and future generations are equally taken into account.
The United Nations Environmental Program has probably influenced the recent tendency of some states to put in their constitutions specific articles concerning environmental protection. Among the states whose constitutions contain an explicit reference to future generations, are Brazil, Guyana, Iran and New Guinea, as well as four states of the United States of America (Hawaii, Illinois, Montana and Pennsylvania). The Brazilian constitution (1987), for example, establishes that “(e)veryone has a right to an ecologically balanced environment... This imposes upon the Public Authorities and the community the obligation to defend and preserve it for present and future generations”; the constitution of New Guinea (1980) states, at the end, that “(i)n the interest of the present and future generations, the State will protect and make rational use of its land, mineral and water resources, as well as its fauna and flora, and will take all appropriate measures to conserve and improve the environment”.
NOTES:
[1] See Kant, Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht, thesis 8.
[2] Kant, Critik der praktischen Vernunft, I, I, 7 (translated by T.K.Abbott).
[3] See Kant, Idee..., cited above, thesis 3.
[4] See Marx, Das Kapital, book III.
[5] H.Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics (MacMillan, London 1907), p.414.
[6] R.DeGeorge, The Environment, Rights and Future Generations, in K.Goodpaster, K.M.Sayre (eds.), Ethics and the Problems of 21th Century (Notre Dame U.P., Notre Dame Ind., 1979), p.95.
[7] H.Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung (Inseg Verlag, Frankfurt a.M. 1979).
[8] Ibid., p.16.
[9] R.Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (Basic Books, New York 1974).
[10] R.Elliot, “Future Generations, Locke’s Proviso and Libertarian Justice,” Journal of Applied Philosophy 3 (1986): 217-27.
[11] See J.Woodward, “The Non-Identity Problem,” Ethics 96 (1986): 804-31.
[12] D.Parfit, “Future Generations. Further Problems,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 11 (1982), p.142.
[13] See J.Narveson, Future People and Us, in R.I.Sikora, B.Barry (eds.), Obligations to Future Generations (Temple U.P., New York 1978): 38-60.
[14] J.Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Harvard U.P., Cambridge Mass. 1971).
[15] See R.M.Hare, Moral Thinking (Oxford U.P., New York 1981).
[16] See D.Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1984), appendix F.
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© Giovanni Scattone 2011
